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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade management of information systems security has emerged to be a
challenging task. Given the increased dependence of businesses on computer-based systems
and networks, vulnerabilities of systems abound. Clearly, exclusive reliance on either the
technical or the managerial controls is inadequate. Rather, a multifaceted approach is needed. In
this paper, based on a panel presented at the 2007 Americas Conference on Information
Systems held in Keystone, Colorado, we provide examples of failures in information security,
identify challenges for the management of information systems security, and make a case that
these challenges require new theory development via examining reference disciplines. We
identify these disciplines, recognize applicable research methodologies, and discuss desirable
properties of applicable theories.
Keywords: management of security, research methods, desirable properties of theories
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, management of information security has mostly relied on technical control measures;
however, research has shown that the majority of information security failures occur because of
violations of controls by trusted personnel. This suggests that management of information
security can only be adequately assured if the emphasis goes beyond technical controls and
incorporates business process and organizational issues. Management of information security is
primarily concerned with strategic, tactical, and operational issues surrounding the planning,
analysis, design, implementation, and maintenance of an organization’s information security
program. Some of the most salient issues include asset valuation, auditing, business continuity
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planning, disaster recovery planning, ethics, organizational communication, policy development,
project planning, risk management, security awareness education/training, and various legal
issues such as liability and regulatory compliance.
In this paper, we document the discussions and findings that the authors identified during a panel
presented at the 2007 Americas Conference on Information Systems held in Keystone, Colorado.
The panel was formed after numerous discussions between the authors who recognized that
information security management is a relatively immature discipline and that it requires additional
academic study. We believe that there is a growing need for research to verify/confirm the
management challenges, discover current management deficiencies, identify best practices,
devise methodologies, and specify requirements for the management of information security. In
this paper, we provide examples of failures in information security, present some of the
challenging issues in information security, and discuss emerging issues we have encountered in
our experiences to provide motivation and directions for future research.
II. THE MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY
Information security management is the process of administering people, policies, and programs
with the objective of assuring continuity of operations while maintaining strategic alignment with
the organizational mission [Cazemier et al. 2000]. Ideally, information security management
activities should be driven by organizational objectives so that no resources are expended on
security without an explicit documented understanding of how it supports the organizational
mission. Historically, information security management has been dealt with solely by establishing
technical and physical controls. However, the increasing use, value, and dependence on
computerized systems to support real world operations have increased the importance of
incorporating process and organizational issues in security risk management [Drucker 1999;
Blakley et al. 2001]. Information security risk management, the process used to identify the
optimal protection strategy when constrained by a limited security budget, has evolved as a
required function within organizations which are concerned with their ability to mitigate the effects
of a breach of information security [Finne 2000]. Such breaches are referred to as “incidents.”
Risk analysis, the first step of the risk management process, requires the identification and
documentation of critical organizational resources (e.g., information, people, processes, and
technologies) among a huge number of total information resources that are used to support the
organizational mission. Determining criticality is not trivial. It requires an estimation of the value
the resource provides to the organization based upon how it supports the organization’s strategic
objectives [Mercuri 2005]. The scale and complexity of the organization, interdependencies
between resources, and the dynamic nature of resource utilization greatly complicate value
determination. However, an accurate resource valuation is essential as it directly impacts the
quality of the decisions made during risk management [Finne 2000]. The valuation, in conjunction
with an estimation of threats, vulnerabilities, and the likelihood (per unit time) of their intersection,
is used to determine the potential damage to a resource, given the state of the organizational
security capability [Gordon and Loeb 2002]. Collectively, this information provides the ability to
rank order and address risks by risk avoidance (e.g., change processes), transference (e.g.,
outsource), mitigation (e.g., apply control measures), or acceptance (e.g., accept possible
losses), commensurate with the value of the resource.
Proper day-to-day and strategic management of information security operations are among
critical success factors in achieving organizational goals. Pipkin [2000] identifies a cyclic, fivephase process to conceptualize the information security management process: inspection,
protection, detection, reaction, and reflection. The inspection phase requires the identification,
valuation, and assignment of ownership of information assets critical to the organization; the
protection phase requires the assignment of the control measures to protect critical information
assets commensurate with their value; the detection phase requires the development of robust
detection capabilities to insure that any breach of the organization is detected in a timely manner;
the reaction phase requires that the organization has developed the resources and capabilities to
quickly respond, contain, investigate, and remediate breaches; and the reflection phase requires
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effective post-incident documentation, reporting, and accountability to assure institutional
learning. Pipkin asserts that assuring organizational security requires consideration of all the five
phases. Neglecting any one of the five phases can expose the organization to excessive losses
when they inevitably experience an information incident. Unfortunately, as will be shown in the
next section, organizations are not aware of, choose not to, or are not capable of implementing
these phases in an effective and efficient manner.
III. EXAMPLES OF FAILURES IN INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY MANAGEMENT
In this section, we present two examples. The first is an example of an actual incident. The
second is hypothetical, though with a high likelihood of occurrence. These examples represent a
small sample of the types of problems that can occur when managing an organizational
information security program. First, consider the May 2005 information security breach of
CardSystems Solutions, Inc. (CSSI), a small credit card transaction processing company, located
in Tucson, Arizona, that employed approximately 115 people [Consumer Affairs 2005; FTC
Complaint 2006]. CSSI provided credit card transaction processing products and services to
approximately 119,000 different merchants, enabling them to accept American Express,
Discover, MasterCard, and VISA credit cards and debit cards as payment [House 2005]. At the
time of the incident, CSSI was processing over 210 million transactions for approximately $15
billion dollars per year. The breach was not detected by CSSI but instead by MasterCard, who
had received complaints from affiliate banks that CSSI was the source of a potential fraud. A
forensic investigation of the CSSI incident revealed that a database containing credit card
information had been compromised nine months prior to the detection of the incident, which
resulted in the theft of more than 40 million credit card records [Mimoso 2006]. This was quite
remarkable, because CSSI had retained the credit card records in direct violation of the VISA
Cardholder Information Security Program and their contractual agreements with VISA,
MasterCard, American Express, and Discover. While at the time few details were released about
the incident, it was revealed that CSSI information systems had been breached via its Internet
facing Web server using a well-known security exploit called a Structured Query Language
injection attack [Mimoso 2006]. The inability for CSSI to properly implement protection, detection,
and reaction serves as a textbook example of the spectacular damage that can occur due to
improper information security management. The fallout from the incident prompted congressional
hearings; resulted in legal and regulatory actions; revealed problems related to accountability,
auditing, due diligence, and notification; and demonstrated the consequences of failing to
properly maintain an effective information security program.
Even organizations that maintain a strong and effective security capability can suffer significant
mission impact and loss if they do not explicitly document their information security risk
management information [Fung et al. 2003; Grimaila and Fortson 2007]. Consider a hypothetical
scenario that demonstrates the consequences that can occur when documentation aspects of
information security management are not properly implemented. In this scenario, a deployed
military organization is conducting an active military operation on foreign soil. One element of the
operation requires the periodic delivery of supplies between facilities located in different parts of
the country via ground vehicles. The commander of the logistics unit uses a logistics
management program that stores the convoy routes and schedules in a network connected
database. The local database is overloaded, so a system administrator decides to relocate the
logistics database to a database server located in another organizational unit without
documenting the change. As often occurs, access to the network is provided to a coalition partner
to facilitate information sharing on an unrelated operation. Unfortunately, the coalition partner
does not enforce stringent access control policies to the network. As a result, an adversary
breaches the coalition partner’s system and uses it as a conduit to gain access to, and breach,
the database server containing convoy routes and schedules. A short time later, the incident is
detected and the adversary’s access to the database is terminated. An Incident Response Team
(IRT) is dispatched to investigate the breach. It finds the cause for the breach and begins to
remediate the system. A key responsibility of the IRT is to notify organizations that have
information stored on the system that their information might have been compromised. The
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problem is that no explicit documentation exists which identifies all of the information owners who
have information stored in the database. Over the next few days, the IRT reconstructs a list of
information owners to notify them of the breach and to gain an understanding of the loss due to
the unavailability of the system during remediation. Before the IRT can complete their
investigation and notify the affected parties, one of the convoys whose schedule was listed in the
database is ambushed, leading to a significant loss of life and loss of supplies. While the scenario
presented is hypothetical, it reveals the consequences that can result from failing to implement a
strict change management process, failing to sufficiently restrict access to partners, and failing to
properly protect critical information resources.
These examples illustrate the damage that can occur from information breaches and demonstrate
opportunities for improvements in information security management. In the first case, if CSSI had
properly implemented a vulnerability assessment and patching process, developed an intrusion
detection capability, and/or periodically audited their information systems, they may have
prevented (or mitigated) the breach. In the second case, if there were a mechanism to document
information dependencies and insure that all information consumers who critically depended upon
information were notified immediately when a breach occurs, the commander would have
rerouted the convoy and prevented the ambush. In many cases, proven policies, procedures, and
practices exist that can significantly mitigate or eliminate risks. However, organizations are often
indifferent to, incapable of, or simply choose not to implement the required protective measures.
The reasons why organizations fail to implement such measures when available appear to be
extremely complex and require substantial research. In order to provide the rationale for the kinds
of research that are needed, a deeper understanding of the challenges in the management of
information security is required.
IV. CHALLENGING ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY
The management of information security faces three major challenges. First, even after decades
of research in the theory and practice of IS security, its management is usually considered as an
afterthought. Second, largely because security is considered as an afterthought, the problem of
development duality creeps in. Third, conceptualizations of information security have largely been
atheoretical. We believe that a focus on these three challenges will help in defining and
addressing many of the problems in managing information security, as evidenced in the case
examples in the previous section.
IS SECURITY AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT
The problem of information security being considered as an afterthought dates back to the era of
checklists. Once a system has been implemented, it was a norm to follow a checklist to address
whether any of the security ‘holes’ remained unplugged. While the information security
community has recognized the inadequacy of checklists as a means to address security
concerns, the checklist culture has, however, prevailed. Therein resides the problem of
information security being considered as an afterthought. The lack of recognition of the
importance of accounting for security during system and product development has resulted in
little or no budget allocation for security. The result is that, if there is any security, it tends to be
“bolted-in” rather than “baked-in.”
Checklist culture in the era of risk analysis has perhaps done the most disservice to the
information system and information security communities relative to the purist use of risk analysis.
The purpose of risk analysis has always been defined as the product of the probability of
occurrence of events and their cost. In order for risk analysis to be useful, it is important to
identify assets that need to be protected, since any calculation of probability of occurrence of a
negative event is in the context of assets that need to be protected. However, checklist culture
forces one to identify and classify criticality of assets based on some predetermined list. At the
same time, the classification of assets is largely vendor driven, without any consideration of the
context of use. This results in risk analysis being applied to assets that have never been
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compromised. Conventional wisdom from probability theory tells us that probability of occurrence
of events can only be accurately calculated if there is data on occurrence of such events in the
past. However, the prevalent checklist culture forbids this from happening. In the case of CSSI,
this is what probably occurred. While the business was more interested in ensuring state of the
art interfaces, security considerations emerged to be rather minimal, since many of the controls
were checked, albeit based on old requirements.
Checklists have also been prevalent in the evaluation of information security. While the ease of
use and convenience in deployment of controls listed in the checklists cannot be disputed, there
are concerns about lack of considerations for the context and the business processes within
which the checklists are applied. Clearly there is a need to go beyond checklists and define
information security requirements in terms of what may be required by the organization. This will
help in considering information security as an enabler of business rather than a requirement that
needs to be fulfilled.
Had CSSI proactively evaluated their business environment and followed guidelines for archiving
records, the breach would not have occurred. There is no doubt that good information security
management can be achieved by proactively focusing on the quality of business processes rather
than fulfilling requirements drawn for some checklist.
DEVELOPMENT DUALITY AND INFORMATION SECURITY
Development duality is a phenomenon where systems and security design are undertaken in
parallel rather than in an integrated manner. This largely occurs when systems developers fail to
recognize the security requirements at the onset of the development process.
In the literature, it has been argued that development duality can be overcome if security
considerations are addressed at the logical design phase of systems development [Baskerville
1988] . This may be true, but one can argue that the real remedy of development duality is
correctness of systems specification. In an ideal world, a correctly specified system should
exactly model the real world. Therefore, requirements analysis is perhaps the most important
stage of systems development, which provides input to the system specifications. Normally
programmers tend to write code based on the requirements. This is where problems emerge.
While it may make sense to take the complete set of requirements for developing the system,
there is a significant semantic gap. It is therefore prudent to develop requirements for security
policy that are based on the user requirements. This would be the first step in formally defining a
high level security specification. A formal specification along with proper usability considerations
feeds into the actual design of a system. Finally the actual code is written. By following a
sequenced approach of this kind, it is possible to overcome development duality. Any failure to do
so results in a semantic gap, which impacts the overall correctness in specification and hence the
security of the system (see Fig 1).

A

Satisfies

Syntactic Domain 1
isfie
Sat

s

B
Semantic Domain
Syntactic Domain2

Figure 1. Correctness in Specification [based on Wing 1990]
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Correctness in system specification is an important information security property. It prevents
development duality from creeping into systems design. While specifying systems, the syntactic
domain (the logical structure of the program) needs to satisfy the semantic domain (the
abstraction of reality). Many times, however, the syntactic domain may only appear to satisfy the
semantic domain, as in the case represented in Figure 1. While syntactic domain “A” correctly
satisfies what needs to be formalized within a universe of discourse, syntactic domain “B” does
not. It just satisfies part of the semantic domain. Clearly, this leads to misspecification with
ensuing errors [see Wing 1990].
ATHEORETIC NATURE OF IS SECURITY METHODS AND TOOLS
A theory is a logical explanation of interactions of a set of phenomena that are capable of
predicting future occurrences or observations of the same kind. Over the past several decades,
the field of information security management has suffered because of a lack of theoretical
conceptualizations. While many researchers have offered interesting insights, there are as yet no
well-established principles that define “good” information security management. There are
multiple factors which conspire to make any research effort difficult. First, organizations are as
unique as human beings are. As a consequence, results collected and generalized from one
organization in a given domain do not always translate well into other domains or for other
organizations. Second, organizations are organic, dynamic entities that change over time. This
fact can often undermine or invalidate an otherwise sound security architecture if it is not
adaptive. Finally, the best policies, procedures, and practices will have little or no value if they are
not followed. Many organizations have developed great guidance but fail to periodically audit their
implementation and operational use. Even worse is when the consequences of committing a
policy violation are not enforced, which is analogous to police never patrolling the highway for
speeders. When this occurs, an organization may falsely believe that it is secure while its
intellectual properties, trade secretes, and other assets are vulnerable and subject to be
compromised. These factors have prevented IS security research from being cumulative.
These three challenges provide a significant number of opportunities for the researchers to leave
their imprint upon the burgeoning stream of research on information security management.
V. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
As a subfield of information systems discipline, information security management is still in its
infancy. Practitioners and academics are clamoring for greater understanding of the problems
presented by information security and assurance activities and more acutely, solutions to those
problems. Therefore, there are tremendous opportunities for new and current researchers to
make a significant impact on the field.
An ongoing area of inquiry is the relationship between information security risk management
practices and other areas of risk management within the firm, or enterprise-wide risk
management. For example, should there be a relationship between the activities undertaken in
managing information-related risks and financial or legal risks? Given the increasing role of state
and federal legislation regarding sensitive data losses in organizations, the need for alignment
between legal and information risk management processes seems clear. However, there seems
to be little in the way of organizational theory that would characterize this relationship. In practice,
very few firms appear to position information security and assurance processes as part of the
overall enterprise risk-management activities. Whether or not this is ideal is an open question.
Certainly, the risk-management approach to information security provides for the characterization
of the rewards, or benefits of using sensitive data and information for decision making. However,
in order to better balance this risk-reward equation, we need to better understand the nature of
the risks involved and the activities undertaken to manage those risks. (We assume for the
purposes of this paper that the rewards are well documented and appreciated.) Several
researchers have tried to examine the risk assessment process itself, particularly in terms of the
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common challenges faced by managers in approaching and executing the process [Baskerville
and Portougal 2003; Sun, Srivastava, and Mock, 2006]. The attitudes, technologies, behaviors,
and other phenomena are incorporated into the risks and activities under consideration. In order
to fully appreciate these risks and the management of them, we need to step back and carefully
examine the theories available within the reference disciplines of economics, strategic
management, organizational behavior, psychology, and other potential sources for application to
the security management problem.
REFERENCE DISCIPLINES AND EXAMPLES OF RESEARCH
Many reference discipline theories and/or frameworks that have been used or explored in the
security context. These include economics, strategic management, psychology, deterrence
theory, theory of planned behavior, resource based view (RBV) of the firm, rational choice theory,
high reliability theory, normal accident theory, social control theory, agency theory, game theory,
complexity theory, and cognitive dissonance theory. Certainly others are plausible.
Researchers have been delving into economic theories as they apply to managing the risks
inherent in information management. Ross Anderson is often credited for initializing this stream of
research [Anderson 2001; Gordon 2006]. Gordon and Loeb [Gordon and Loeb 2002] published
the first economic analysis for rational investments in information security controls, making some
headway against the Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) practice which is still common in the
actual practice of security management. Other researchers, for example, August and Tunca
[2006] examined network software security, particularly patching behaviors, within a gametheoretic environment. Managing intrusion detection systems from the firm value perspective was
the focus of other research [Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2005]. Gal-Or and Ghose
[2005] also used game theory to study the effects of information sharing among firms for
managing information security risks. We need to encourage further exploration of this domain as
economics clearly is a strong motivating force in the actions and responses of firms, as well as
attackers.
There is also a need to explore and assimilate theories from the strategic management literature.
There exists a long history of theories, such as the behavioral theory of the firm [March and
Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963] and the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm [Wernerfelt
1984], that seek to explain firm behavior which will be vital to better understanding the security
requirements and potentially effective responses of firms in managing their information risk.
Finally, there is a strong need to continue the survey of the psychology, sociology, and criminal
justice literatures in terms of organizing and better understanding not only the criminal element of
information risk but also the individual and employee role in information risk management. Some
of the earliest work in the field [Straub and Collins 1990; Straub and Nance 1990; Goodhue and
Straub 1991; Harrington 1996; Straub and Welke 1998] draws theoretical grounding from these
disciplines. Further progress in this area has been made by Dhillon and Torkzadeh [2006], with
the use of value focused thinking for strategizing about information security objectives. The
strategy literature has significantly been influenced by sociology, so it seems prudent to delve into
the sociological paradigms to inform information security theory development. Some initial
guidelines have been provided by Dhillon and Backhouse [2001]. As more emphasis is placed on
employees and other insiders being the “weakest link,” particularly as there is more interest from
attackers on social engineering types of attacks, we will need much additional research into how
to better manage this segment of the information security chain.
There is a substantial need to scrutinize current “best practices.” Best practices are often created
using a “one size fits all” mentality which fails to account for organizational differences. These
practices need to be assessed in terms of the theories catalogued above and then tested, both
analytically and empirically as relevant. We also need to consider what linkages, if any, exist
between security activities and corporate strategy, enterprise risk management, business
intelligence, and knowledge management. For example, could security ever lead to a competitive
advantage for firms outside the security product and service space? There also exists a need to
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focus on the pressing issue of quickly securing the integration of new technologies into the
organization, particularly wireless and mobile technologies. We also need to consider supply
chain and virtual organizations.
Information security and assurance policies are the “vehicle” for managing the identified risks to
the organization. However, there is a great deal of unknown regarding the proper management
and use of security policies. More specifically, are there ideal designs for security policies in
organizations? Are there tested guidelines for developing and implementing security policies that
are tied to theory? When do we retire security policies? A few researchers are looking into this
issue [Doherty and Fulford 2005]. Again, an inherently interdisciplinary approach is required.
Insider threat is another interesting problem that requires more research. While there have been
great strides for protecting systems from outside threats, only modest work has been conducted
on defending against the malicious insider [Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson 2005]. Are
certain organizations more susceptible to insider threat? Are certain types of employees more
susceptible to succumbing to temptation, opportunity, and so on? How can managers, security
practitioners, and human resource professionals design and implement more effective programs
to better manage this threat?
Additional research is also needed to explore successful security programs. Why are certain
firms able to effectively implement and execute business continuity plans, which encompass
various aspects of information security, whereas other firms struggle to do so in the face of
various incidents affecting information assets? Why have organizations resisted implementing
new technologies or improving procedures when it is so clear in hindsight, if not beforehand, that
disastrous consequences are nearly inevitable? For example, the CSSI incident, where data was
not deleted in violation of protocol, raises questions of why procedures were not followed. Was it
purely a matter of economics? Overly optimistic thinking? Systems complexity overwhelming the
information processing capabilities of managers? Lack of education and training?
POSITIONING OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
Various methodologies can be and have been applied in conducting research in this field. Among
others, these include analytics, empirical, lab experiments, and simulation. In addition, there still
is a strong need for theory clarification and aggregation. The field is not mature enough to
exclude any particular methodological approaches. There is definitely an opportunity to build
theory here, and we explicitly invite our colleagues versed in qualitative techniques to add
assistance here.
There are a growing number of analytical papers from the economics of information systems
community. As mentioned earlier, a number of papers using game theory have been published in
this arena, for example, August and Tunca [2006], Gal-Or and Ghose [2005], and Cavusoglu et
al. [2005]. These papers are vital as they are attempting to link firm financial issues to securityrelated topics. These papers are important not only for understanding the economic phenomena
surrounding information security in organizations but also for providing motivation for corporate
funding for ongoing research. More analytical research with respect to quantitative managerial
model analysis needs to be executed. Decision support in terms of statistical analysis, machine
learning, and heuristics are all vital for today’s managers working in a dynamic and complex
environment. Hamill and colleagues adopted a value-focused thinking approach [Hamill, Deckro,
and Kloeber 2005] for evaluating and assessing information assurance strategies. Genetic
algorithms were used to match software vulnerabilities to specific security technology profiles
[Gupta, Rees, Chaturvedi, and Chi 2006]. A risk-management approach to security investments
has also been tried [Yue, Cakanyildirim, Ryu, and Liu 2007].
There is certainly a need for continued empirical work. We have seen a number of event studies
published within the domain. However, many unanswered and conflicting results call for further
and deeper research into this area. There is a growing interest in adoption and diffusion studies

Management of Information Security: Challenges and Research Directions by J. Choobineh, G. Dhillon,
M.R. Grimaila, and J. Rees

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 20, 2007) 958- 971

966

of technologies, policies, and certifications. These studies should be encouraged, as they could
have important policy implications for researchers and practitioners.
There have been few lab experiments performed via the experimental economics tradition.
Depending on the framing of the research question, students may be sufficient proxies for
employees and certainly for average home users. Certainly, in-depth field research, while difficult,
expensive, and time-consuming, is needed. Another possibility is to incorporate “nonobvious”
data sources. Are there security implications for organizations through employee use of
FaceBook and MySpace? What about blogging or Second Life? Certainly, discussion boards and
blogs have been of concern from a marketing and brand perspective, hence the creation of
reputation management services. The Department of Defense has recognized these risks. On
May 11, 2007, U.S. Army Commander General B.B. Bell signed a directive prohibiting access to
13 popular culture sites for operational security reasons [Associated Press 2007]. Are competitors
able to locate more information about organizations on the Web than is prudent? What research
opportunities do these media present to researchers, especially those working with large data
sets or in knowledge discovery settings?
Finally, simulation has an important role to play. As we become more and more adept at agentbased simulation methods, these methods should find a role in scenario planning, validation and
verification.
DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF INFORMATION SECURITY THEORIES
The previous discussion emphasized the urgent need to identify existing applicable theories in
the various reference disciplines as well as formulating security-specific theories in order to
inform current and future research. Any theory identified or formulated needs to adhere to the
following criteria:
•

Consistency. Consistency refers to the property where all premises hold in the model.
That is, the model proves that the theory is consistent. Usually any arbitrary model of a
theory is sufficient to prove its consistency. However, in practice, it makes sense to find
more natural models of the theory, meaning that we examine various models and assess
if they conform to the mental models of a theory. This helps in safeguarding against not
so obvious inconsistencies (e.g., inconsistencies because the background knowledge
remains implicit).

•

Soundness. Any theory presupposes assumptions grounded on the substantive field.
One of the major challenges in developing a theory is to define the assumptions that
need to be included. This requires a deep understanding of the field. Soundness refers to
the ability to ground assumptions in the literature such that implicitly the theory makes
sense.

•

Falsifiability. A theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable [Popper 1959]. The attempt
therefore is to find a model (or framework) in which the definitions hold and the
assumptions (or a theorem) are false.

•

Satisfiability/Contingency. The notion of satisfiability is one where the models or
frameworks are true for the definitions and the assumptions. In such cases the empirical
claims can be either corroborated or refuted.

•

Experience Explication. An information security theory ought not to be just an opinion as
to how security might exist in an organization. Rather it should be an attempt at
formulating the meaning of its existence. This would be done by explicating the content of
some very definitive experiences. Such experiences would obviously have to be logically
classified and interpreted. The argument of such a theory would not be arbitrary, but it
would derive its validity from the aggregate of experiences. Such a theory should invoke
or suggest occurrence of parallel experiences, which in many ways would be an empirical
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test of the truth of a theory. If a theory is unable to identify some sort of an explication of
experiences, then at best the theory may be considered irrelevant or it may be rejected.
A careful consideration of these criteria facilitates systematic development of theory that helps in
explaining and predicting occurrences. Such a theory is needed for information security.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Modern organizations are heavily dependent on their computerized information systems for their
low-level day-to-day operations, high-level strategic decision-making process, and all the
administration functions in between these two. Given this dependency, organizations have
become increasingly vulnerable to attacks through their networks and their information systems.
Proper management of information security has become a very important consideration. As this
paper was developed from a panel discussion, the comments from the members of the audience
further underscored the importance of addressing the various problems of information security
from a multitude of perspectives. Audience members ranged from seasoned researchers looking
for new research questions to practitioners transitioning into academia. The questions ranged
from potential publication outlets to working more closely with industry in identifying and
addressing problems of interest. It appeared quite clear that everyone in the room was in
agreement that information security is not only a technical issue, best left to our computer science
and engineering colleagues, but is a risk management and business process issue, that must be
viewed through multiple lenses.
In order to properly address this issue, we have identified three relevant management problems.
These are: 1) addressing security after the system has been developed, resulting in an overall
less secure system; 2) parallel design of security and information systems; and 3) lack of theories
in the development of solutions to these problems. This identification provides a fertile ground for
development and testing of new theories. We suggested various reference disciplines for this
development. Among others, these include economics, game theory, strategic management,
psychology, sociology, and criminology. Research methodologies for developing and testing the
theories could vary widely from ethnographical methods to various types of experiments. The
most important consideration in developing the theories is that they should explain at least one
and preferably a collection of similar experiences in the field. This requires deep understanding of
real world security management problems followed by their classification, categorization, and
attribution. It is clear to us that opportunities for research in the information system security
domain will continue to grow as our dependence on information technology grows.
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